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NOTES AND COMMENTS
NEGLIGENCE-PROXIMATE CAUSE
UNLIKELIHOOD OF PHYSICAL RECOVERY AS PRECLUDING DE-
FENDANT'S NEGLIGENCE FROM BEING PROXIMATE CAUSE
OF INJURY
The subject of causation, with its accompanying intriguing "catch"
words and phrases, has long been perhaps the most interesting, and
simultaneously the most perplexing, phase of the law of torts. Ample
attest to this statement are the myriad law review articles and exhaustive
judicial opinions which have dealt with the topic. That the issue is by
no means moot; that the controversy still waxes keen, is indicated by
current decisions, which consistently present new and fascinating points
for discussion.
In the recent case of Kuhn v. Banker' the Supreme Court of Ohio
held that even though there is evidence of malpractice sufficient for sub-
mission to the jury of that issue, a verdict must be directed in favor of
the defendant where it appears from the evidence that the probability
of normal recovery by the patient was less than half, even in the exercise
of due care by the physician. The court said: "To maintain her action
the plaintiff was required to prove not only negligence or unskillfulness
amounting to malpractice on the part of the defendant but also that the
act of malpractice was the proximate cause of injury and damage to
plaintiff.' -
The facts were briefly: plaintiff had suffered a broken hip which
was properly and efficiently set by the defendant, this setting being fol-
lowed by a disunion occasioned by absorption through natural processes
at the bony union-an occurrence disclosable only by means of X-ray
photography, this method being the accepted medical practice in the par-
ticular locality. Plaintiff complained of a grating sensation in her hip,
and exclaimed that her hip wasn't "together," but met with a scoffing
attitude on the part of the defendant who failed to X-ray the fracture
to ascertain whether the plaintiff's claims were founded on facts. Some
three months thereafter an examination by an independent physician
revealed the disunion, which, by this time, had progressed to such an
extent as to be incurable by natural processes, and consequently extreme
surgical methods, specif., wiring the fractured bone together, were, of
necessity, resorted to, in order to remedy the situation to the fullest
possible extent. By the disunion the plaintiff was from fifty to seventy-
five per cent disabled from active occupation. Expert testimony estab-
133 Ohio St. 304, Ohio Bar, Feb. zi, 1938.
"lbidp. 310.
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lished as fact that, had the defendant followed standard practices and
been guilty of no negligence whatever, there was nevertheless a lesser
likelihood, rather than a greater one, that a bony reunion would have
taken place. On these facts the directed verdict in favor of defendant,
granted by the trial court, was affirmed by the Supreme Court.
The case raises the following question, viz.: Does the fact that an
injury has less than an even chance to heal properly, prevent the negli-
gence of plaintiff's attending physician from being the proximate cause of
the injury accompanying the failure to heal?
The question of "probabilities" is encountered in many phases of the
law, and the resolution of the problem is not always the same. Thus, in
order to clarify subsequent discourse, and focus the discussion on the
precise issue, it is advisable to draw the "fine line of distinction" between
the use and significance of the word in its treatment in problems involv-
ing the judge and jury, and those involving causation. Probably as con-
cise and accurate a statement of the true differentiation between the two
is that made by Jeremiah Smith in his discussion of "Legal Cause in
Actions of Tort,"3 where he says:
We submit that the word "probable," when used in laying down a test of
duty to use care or when used in the alleged rules affirming or restricting
liability for the consequences of a tort, does not carry the full meaning belong-
ing to it when used in charging a jury as to the quantum of proof. When
the judge tells the jury that the plaintiff must satisfy them that the existence
of an alleged fact is probable4 (that a certain proposition is probably true), he
means that the jury must find that the chances (the balance of probabilities)
are in favor of the existence of the disputed fact. If the jury find that the
chances in favor of its existence are only three out of six (and a fortiori if
only three out of seven), they must find against the party upon whom the
burden of proof rests. But if the chances of harm resulting to plaintiff, in
case certain precautions are not taken by defendant, are three out of seven,
the jury would often be justified in finding the defendant negligent if he
could have taken those precautions and failed to do so. So when the question
is one of causal relation it is a mistake to use language implying that a conse-
quence in order to be "probable" must be "one that is more likely to follow
its supposed cause than it is to fail to follow it." "Probable," both in testing
the duty to use care and in the alleged rule as to causation, does not mean
"more likely than not," but rather "not unlikely"; or, more definitely, "such
a chance of harm as would induce a prudent man not to run the risk; such a
chance of harmful result that a prudent man would foresee an appreciable
risk that some harm would happen." 5
a Sel. Essays on the Law of Torts, p. 649, 2z5 Harv. L. Rev. 103, 2z3, 303 (Dec.,
19ii-Jan., Feb., 1912).
' Italics writer's.
5 SeI. Essays on the Law of Torts, p. 649, 66z. See pp. 66z et seg. for examples of
terminology re "probable consequences" rule.
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Somewhat more briefly stated, but to the same effect, as respects the
charge of the judge to the jury, is the following remark from Davis v.
Guarnieri: "It is not necessary to the determination of the issues in a
civil case * * * that the triers should believe the existence of any ma-
terial fact, but that the probabilities, when weighed by them, preponderate
in favor of the fact which they find to be established by the proof. It is
legally and logically impossible for it to be probable that a fact exists,
and at the same time probable that it does not exist." 7
As indicative of the importance of this distinction, and illustrative of
the aura of confusion surrounding it in some decisions, the following
quotation from Judge Smith's previously cited articles is valuable:
There are some opinions which "betray a confusion of the principles of
'legal cause' with those underlying the requirements concerning certainty of
proof . . . ." Suppose that plaintiff has failed to make out by preponderance
of evidence that defendant's tort was, in fact, the cause of plaintiff's damage.
Then the case should be decided on the short ground that plaintiff has failed
to establish the existence of causal relation; and there is no occasion for the
court to say whether, if that relation had been made out, they would never-
theless have denied recovery on the ground that the damage, even though it
actually resulted, was improbable. Yet cases of this sort may be found where
the court appears to base the decision upon the alleged rule that the improb-
ability of a consequence bars recovery for any damage, even though it was
actually caused by defendant's tort. Certainly such opinions ought not be
counted as authorities in favor of the alleged rule.'
The "rules" for ascertaining the appropriate occasions on which to
impose tort liability for injurious consequences accruing to others from
acts or omissions on the part of the defendant are numerous, and due to
the varied precepts which they recite are deserving of some notice.
Among them "Lord Bacon's Maxim,"' 0 the "But For" rule," Mill's
,45 Ohio St. 470, 490, 15 N.E. 350 (1887).
Approved in Cincinnati, Hamilton & Dayton Ry. Co. v. Frye, So Ohio St. 289, 88
N.E. 642, 531 Am. St. Rep. 709 (909).
Accord: Lippold v. Kidd, 126 Ore. 16o, z69 Pac. 210, 59 A.L.R 875 (1928); Ram-
berg v. Morgan, 2o9 Iowa 474, asS N.W. 492 ('928).
Re directed verdict, see: Hubach v. Cole, 133 Ohio St. 137, 140 ('938); Hamden
Lodge v. Ohio Fuel Gas Co., 5z7 Ohio St- 469, 189 N.E. 246 (1934); Matuschka v.
Murphy, x73 Wis. 484, s8o N.V. Baa (x9z); Loomis v. Toledo Rys. & Light Co.,
107 Ohio St. x61, 54o N.E. 639 ('9z3)5 Cleveland Ry. Co. v. Sutherland, is Ohio St.
26z, x1z N.E. 7z6 (x926); Doumitt v. Diemer, 144 Ore. 36, 23 Pac. (zd) 98 ('933)-
Sel. Essays on the Law of Torts, p. 649.
Ibid., p. 671.
The author makes the following additional statement: "Whenever a requisite to
maintenance of a plaintiff's claim or any part of it cannot be established with sufficient
certainty, the plaintiff fails pro tanto; but because of the principles concerning certainty of
proof, not because of any principle of proximate cause." (P. 67z).
I' "In iure non remota causa, sed proxima, spectatur." Bacon's Maxims of the Law,
Regula I.
Bacon comments: "It were infinite for the law to judge the causes of causes, and
their impulsions one of another; therefore it contenteth itself with the immediate cause;
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"Logician's Theory,"' 2 and the "Last Wrongdoer Rule"' 3 are variously
espoused as the correct and adequate test, but none presently receives too
great acclamation. More important to consider is the "Probable Conse-
quences Rule,""' which asserts, according to Judge Smith," actually two
rules, viz.: a wrongdoer is liable for probable consequences only, but (a)
"if a consequence which actually resulted from defendant's tort was a
probable consequence, then defendant cannot escape liability on the
ground that his tort was not the legal cause"; however (b) "if a conse-
quence which actually resulted from defendant's tort was an improbable
consequence, then defendant is exonerated on the ground that his tort
was not the legal cause."'" Clearly, the phrase "probable consequences"
and judgeth of acts by that, without looking to any further degree."
Jeremiah Smith comments: "Taken literally, the maxim would be understood as
implying that the antecedent which is nearest in space or time is invariably to be regarded
as the legal cause; * * * But it is a mistake to suppose that contiguity in space or nearness
in time are legal tests of the existence of causal relation. No doubt these elements are
often important to be considered in determining the question of fact as to the existence
of such relation; but lack of contiguity or nearness would not, as matter of law, conclu-
sively establish that the defendant's tort was not the cause of the damage." (z5 Harv.
L. Rev. i03, 114).
See Bishop v. St. Paul City Ry., 48 Minn. z6, 5o N.W. 927 (189z), where plaintiff's
paralysis did not develop until more than seven months after the accident, but nonetheless
the defendant's tort was found to have been the proximate cause.
" This rule, which is sometimes called the "Causa sine qua non" test, is fairly widely
accepted, but has the demerit of being inapplicable affirmatively, and consequently is not a
sufficient sole test for determination of liability. The rule states that if, but for the com-
mission of the defendant's tort the damage would not have occurred, then his tort is the
legal cause of such damage; or, conversely; the defendant's tort is not the legal cause of
plaintiff's damage if the damage would probably have occurred in the absence of such tort.
However, in instances where there are two simultaneously operating negligent or wilful
tortfeasors, each of whose act is sufficient in itself to bring about the harmful result to
plaintiff, either, or both, in a proper instance, may be held liable. The rule makes no
allowance for this obvious exception.
' Mill, Logic, 9 Eng. ed., 378-383.
This rule, in gist, affirms that "all antecedents are equally causes, or rather parts of
the cause (the cause being the sum of all the antecedents), and we have no right to single
out any one of them and call it the cause." (Sel. Essays on the Law of Torts, p. 649, 656,
f.n. z6). It is open to the obvious criticism of being too theoretical to be helpful. "The
distinction between cause and condition would be valuable, if there were any definite
standard for determining what is a cause and what is a condition." (I Jaggard, Torts,
64.) Says Pollock, " ...the contrast of 'cause' and 'condition' is dangerous to refine
upon; . . . " (Pollock, Torts, 8 ed., 464, note 1).
'a This rule is advocated by Dr. Wharton, and urges that "the legal cause is the last
(or nearest) culpable human actor to be found in the chain of antecedents; i.e., the one
acting last before, or nearest to, the happening of the damage to plaintiff." (Sel. Essays
on the Law of Torts, p. 649, 657). See Wharton, Negligence, I ed., section 85-9o, and
134-145. Although the rule is generally effective and adequte it makes no allowance for
two certain facts, viz., (i) the last tortfeasor may not be the efficient cause of plaintiff's
damage, due to remoteness and exhaustion of the force which he set in motion; and (2)
other antecedent parties, other than the last wrongdoer, may also be liable, and chargeable
at the election of the plaintiff. See A.L.I. Restatement of the Law of Torts, Section 439,
and Sections 442-453-
' See 25 Harv. L. Rev. 103, pp. 114 et seq.
1 "Legal Cause in Actions of Tort," supra.
's bid., p. 14.
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does not refer exclusively to consequences more probable than not,' and
today the rule is frequently stated in terms of "foreseeability."' Lastly,
the general rule proposed by Jeremiah Smith, at the conclusion of his
essay on the subject of legal cause, requires that the defendant's tort
must have been a "substantial factor" in producing the damage to the
plaintiff. Smith phrases it thus: "To constitute such causal relation be-
tween defendant's tort and plaintiff's damage as will suffice to maintain
an action of tort, the defendant's tort must have been a substantial factor
in producing the damage complained of."' 9 This test is commended by
reiteration in the Restatement of the Law of Torts0 in Section 431,
wherein "legal cause" is defined as follows:
The actor's negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm to another if (a) his
conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, and (b) if there is
no rule of law relieving the actor from liability because of the manner in
which his negligence has resulted in the harm.
This appears to be a workable rule, if somewhat susceptible to indi-
vidual interpretation of the phrase "substantial factor."'" Perhaps therein
lies its value.
The essential problem which confronts us at this point is that of lia-
bility of individual tortfeasors in instances of multiple causation. As a
general proposition it may be baldly averred that, in cases of concurrent
negligence, defendants are liable as long as the negligent act of each
is a substantial factor, sufficient to produce the damage complained of;
and thus, no defendant is excused merely because the negligence of
another defendant would have been sufficient of itself to cause the loss.
This assertion is supported by the Restatement of Torts, supra, in Section
432 (i) and (2), where it is said:
(i) Except as stated in Subsection (2), the actor's negligent conduct is
not a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another if it would have
been sustained even if the actor had not been negligent.
17 Supra, p. 373
"See article by Prof. Bohlen in 56 Univ. Pa. L. Rev. 33', note 79.
" Sel. Essays on the Law of Torts, 649, 712.
2' Amer. L. Inst. (I934).
Cl See 21 Mich. L. Rev. 34, at p. 173, where Albert Levitt proposes the following set
of rules by which to gauge proximate cause:
i. If a forbidden act produces a force which causes an injury, that act is the proxi-
mate cause of the injury.
z. If a forbidden act creates that which causes a force to produce an injury, that act
is the proximate cause of the injury.
3- If a forbidden omission fails to stop a force from causing an injury, that omission
is the proximate cause of the injury.
4. If a forbidden omission fails to stop that which produces the cause of an injury,
that omission is the proximate cause of the injury.
S. If a forbidden passive situation concurs with lawful activities, or with activities
that are outside the purview of the law, to produce an injury, that forbidden passive situa-
tion is the proximate caue of the injury.
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(z) If two forces are actively operating, one because of the actor's negli-
gence, the other not because of any misconduct on his part, and each of itself
is sufficient to bring about harm to another, the actor's negligence may be held
to be a substantial factor in bringing it about.
Obviously these statements refer to "harmful consequences" either
potentially or actually resulting from tortious acts or omissions of the
defendant. No suggestion is made as to the rule governing prospects of
"recovery" from existing maladies or injuries, nor is any intimation
offered that these rules were intended to apply to such situations."2
Professor Joseph H. Beale propounds the following proposition:
"Where the act is the failure merely of a legal duty, causation is estab-
lished only when the doing of the act would have prevented the result;
if the result would have happened just as it did whether the alleged actor
had done his duty or not the failure to perform the duty was not a
factor in the result, or, in other words, did not cause it."" This assertion
is substantially in accord with the position taken by Jeremiah Smith in his
substantial factor rule, supra, and with the later declarations of Section
432 (1) of the Restatement of Torts, supra. There is ample case mate-
rial to lend additional support. For instance, in Regina v. Dalloway2" it
appeared that the defendant was driving negligently when a child ran in
front of his horses and was killed. Erle, J., charged that if, in the exer-
2 The following is an excerpt from the Restatement of Torts, supra, commenting
upon Section 432 (z) and (2):
Section 432():
(a) If, without the actor's negligent conduct, the other would have sustained harm,
the same in character and extent as that which he receives, the actor's conduct, except in
the situation dealt with in Subsection (z), not being even its necessary antecedent, is not
a substantial factor in bringing it about.
(b) The statement in this Subsection is most frequently, although not exclusively,
applicable where the actor's tortious conduct consists in a failure to take some precautions
which are required for the protection of another's person or land or chattels. In such case,
if the same harm, both in character and extent, would have been sustained even had the
actor taken the required precautions, his failure to do so is not even a perceptible factor in
bringing it about and cannot be a substantial factor in producing it.
[Illustration: Ford v. Trident Fisheries Co., 2z N.E. (Mass.) 389 (99).
(c) * * * In order to prevent the actor's negligent conduct from being a substantial
factor, it must clearly appear that the required precautions would have proved unavailing
or that the harm would have been sustained even had the negligent act not been done.
[Illustration: Reynolds v. Texas & P. R. Co., 37 La. Ann. 694 (z885).]
Section 432(2):
(d) The statement in Subsection (z) applies not only when the second force which
is operating simultaneously with the force set in motion by the defendant's negligence is
generated by the negligent conduct of a third person, but also when it is generated by an
innocent act of a third person or when its origin is unknown.
[Illustration: Anderson v. Minn., St. P. & S. Ste. M. R. Co., 146 Minn. 43 o, 179
N.W. 45 (1920)- Contra: Cook v. Minn., St. P. & S. Ste. M. R. Co., 98 Wis. 624,
74 N.W. 561 (1898); Kingston v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 1g1 Wis. 61o, 211 N.W. 913
(1927).]
s Beale, "The Proximate Consequences of an Act," 33 Harv. L. Rev. 633, 637
(z9zo), Sel. Essays on the Law of Torts, p. 730, 734.
24 2 Cox, C.C. 273 (1847).
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cise of the greatest possible care, he could not have avoided the accident,
he must be acquitted. So too, in Piqua v. Morris5 where the embank-
ment of defendant's reservoir broke away and water injured plaintiff's
land the negligence of the defendant in failing to maintain a sufficient
spillway was held not to be the cause of the loss where it was shown
that the flood on this occasion was so extraordinarily great that a sufficient
spillway would not have saved the embankment. Thus, in Stacy v.
Knickerbocker Ice Go.2" defendant failed to maintain a fence around
an opening in the lake ice from which ice had been removed. Plaintiff's
horses escaped and crashed through the opening in the ice, being
drowned. Evidence revealed that the horses were plunging in such a
headlong dash that had defendant maintained an ordinarily sufficient
fence it could not have checked them, and consequently verdict was
rendered for the defendant." And, in Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Sul-
phur Springs Independent School District" albeit defendant negligently
constructed an embankment across the mouth of a hollow through which
ran a rivulet, the fact that the flood which swept through the hollow
was of such unprecedented magnitude that it would have caused the
damage notwithstanding defendant had not been negligent was held to
be enough to preclude defendant's negligence from being a proximate
cause of the damage accruing to the plaintiff. In each of these cases it
must be noted that the damage would have occurred at all events; i.e.,
the occurrence of the damage was in no sense problematical, but was, on
the other hand, certain. There seems to be no question but that, in such
a situation, where the concurring cause is innocent,"9 and the damage
is inevitable despite all that defendant could do, the defendent should be
absolved.
Some cases are, however, closer to the line. For example, in Ford v.
Trident Fisheries Co." the mate of defendant's vessel fell therefrom into
the sea and never rose to the surface. The ship's boat was negligently
lashed to the deck so that it could not be seasonably launched and used.
Held: In the absence of evidence of the possibility of saving Ford (the
mate), causation by the defendant had not been proved. Similarly, in
Gutman v. Bronx Borough Bank"' the verdict was returned for the
2 98 Ohio St. 42, i2o N.E. 300 (98).
"" 84 Wis. 614, 4. N.W. 5o95 (1893).
-' Accord: Sowles v. Aloore, 65 Vt. 322, z6 Atl. 629 (1893).
96 Pa. 65, 4z Am. Rep. Sz9 (s88o).
Except for casual references the instant discussion is not concerned with those
problems wherein there are two tortfeasors concurring, either both actively, or one actively
and one passively. For the purpose of this dissertation the concurring cause is assumed, if
not otherwise stated, to be innocent, or of unknown origin, presumably innocent.
3V zz N.E. (Mass.) 389 (919).
31 x88 App. Div. 664, 177 N.Y. Supp. I73 (1919).
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defendant on the ground that its tort was not the substantial cause of the
injury to plaintiff. Here plaintiff had sent a check to her broker to keep
good her margin on a falling stock, and defendant wrongfully refused to
cash it, whereupon she was sold out. The court was of the opinion that
plaintiff could not recover unless she could show, by the course of the
market, that otherwise she would not have lost both stock and check.
Again, in Reynolds v. Texas & P. R. Co."5 where plaintiff, a large
woman weighing more than 250 pounds, was hurrying to a train and
fell down the steps in defendant's poorly lighted passageway, there was
evidence that plaintiff "might" have fallen had the passageway been
adequately lighted. The court instructed the jury to find for the plaintiff
on the basis that the mere possibility that the accident might have hap-
pened without defendant's negligence in insufficient to break the causal
chain between such negligence and the resultant injury. It will be
noticed that in the Ford and Gutman cases the courts emphasized the
fact that evidence of a "possibility" that the accident might have been
averted was lacking, and the natural inference to be drawn from such
stresses is that had such a possibility been disclosed by the proof, the
negligent defendant would have been charged with liability. In the
Reynolds case, however, the "possibility" was on the other side of the
scales, thus making it a much stronger case, for it would seem fairly clear
that the fact that there is a bare possibility that injury might occur
despite the absence of any negligence on the part of the defendant is
insufficient to exonerate the said defendant.
Chief Justice Peaslee,33 in his article on "Multiple Causation and
Damage,"34 arrives at the conclusion that, where one cause is innocent,
and the causes are strictly concurrent, the tortfeasor should not be
liable."a This determination is not uncontested. In Cook v. Minneapolis,
St. P. & S. Ste. M. R. Co."0 the plaintiff sought to recover for the
destruction of his dwelling by fire. It appeared that defendant had
negligently permitted a fire to escape from its right of way, which fire
was sufficient, in itself, to destroy plaintiff's home, but that simultaneously
32 37 La. Ann. 694 (188).
"2James Robert Peaslee, LL.B., Boston Univ., 1886; Chief Justice, Supreme Court
of New Hampshire.
3447 Harv. L. Rev. 1127 (1934).
3 Peaslee comments: "In the solution of this problem three elements have been
stressed: (i) the immediateness of causationi (z) the quantity or percentage of causation
where there are multiple causes; and (3) the strictly moral element, including the state
or operation of the actor's mind." (Ibid., p. 1z8). This reference to the state of mind
of the actor seems to be somewhat out of harmony with certain statements made by Smith,
with whom Peaslee generally coincides, viz.: "There is no reason why probability should
be any more essential to actual existence of causal relation in negligent torts than in
intentional torts." (Sel. Essays on the Law of Torts, p. 649, 696).
36 98 Wis. 624, 74 N.W. 561 (1898).
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operating with defendant's fire was one of unknown origin, presump-
tively innocently set, as by spontaneous combustion, this latter conflagra-
tion being also solely sufficient to destroy plaintiff's house. The court
held for defendant, applying the "But For" rule.3 Thus, in Kingston
v. Chicago & N. V. Ry." the court, under similar facts, absolved the
defendant, but required it to satisfactorily prove to the jury that the
second fire was innocently set. Contra is inderson v. Minneapolis, St.
P. & S. Ste. M. R. Co.,3 0 which, under similar facts, held for the plain-
tiff. This latter view is supported by the Restatement of Torts in Section
432 (2), comment (d). 4" Peaslee, who cites these cases in his article,
4
'
criticizes the Anderson case and the sustaining position taken by the
Restatement, supra; he sides with Judge Smith in asserting that the
"But For" rule is more appropriately applicable to these instances of con-
curring causation.42
Up to this point the question of damages has not been squarely met.
Clearly "damage done is an essential element in the cause of action for
negligence," 43 and thus, in these instances of dual causation wherein
there is an innocent cause operating simultaneously with the defendant's
tort, the argument is made that if the plaintiff is permitted to recover
in toto he will be better off than he would have been had defendant done
no wrong. Patently the counter to this contention is that had not the
innocent cause been present the defendant's act would have accomplished
the injurious result anyway. Some courts leave the question at this
point, saying that since the object of tort law is compensation for wrong
done, not punishment of the wrongdoer, these claims cannot be heard,
or, if heard, cannot avail the complainant, for the burden resting upon
the plaintiff to make out his case, these arguments, by leaving the situa-
tion in equipoise, defeat him.44 Says Peaslee: "The points to be stressed
are: (I) that the separable character of damage following upon the
successive operation of innocent and guilty causes has been largely lost
sight of by those who maintain that the guilty actor must answer for all,
37 Footnote 22, supra.
191 Wis. 6xo, ziI N.W. 913 (1927).
' 146 Minn. 430, 179 N.W. 45 (192o).
4, Note 22, supra.
41 47 Harv. L. Rev. 11 27 (1934).
" In a series of "explanations" which Smith addends to his article is included the
following: "Explanation 3. A defendant's tort cannot be considered a legal cause of
plaintiff's damage, if that damage would have occurred just the same even though the
defendant's tort had not been committed. Exception: Where two tortfeasors are simul-
taneously operating independently of each other, and the separate tortious act of each is
sufficient in and of itself to produce the damaging result." (zS Harv. L. Rev. 31z).
4a 47 Harv. L. Rev. I 127, 1130.
44 Ibid.
See supra, Piua v. Morris, 98 Ohio St. 42, 12o N.E. 300 (918).
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and (2) that impending innocent causation may produce an actual loss
where the threat of guilty but compensable cause would not."4 Thus
he urges that "If it appears that at last some part of the loss would have
been avoided had the defendant acted prudently, liability should fol-
low."4 According to the author, "Separation of damage is no novelty
in the law. Even when there are multiple wrongdoers, if the act of one
has already caused harm, the act of another which then operates upon the
damaged object creates no liability if it occasions no additional injury.
The question is merely whether the damages are separable in fact."
'4
Quaere: When was the damage done?4"
In Dillon v. Twin State Gas & Electric Co.4" a boy standing on a
high trestle bridge lost his balance and was falling to certain death on
the rocks below when he was electrocuted by coming in contact with
defendant's wrongfully charged electric wire. The verdict was for
plaintiff, and judgment was for only such sum as the boy's prospects
for life and health were worth at the time defendant's fault became
causal. The court said:
Although he died from electrocution, yet if by reason of his preceding
loss of balance he was bound to fall except for the intervention of the current,
he either did not have long to live or was to be maimed. In such an outcome
of his loss of balance the defendant deprived him, not of a life of normal
expectancy, but of one too short to be given pecuniary allowance, in one alter-
native, and not of normal, but of limited, earning capacity, in the other.
If it were found that he would have thus fallen with death probably result-
ing, the defendant would not be liable unless for conscious suffering found
to have been sustained from the shock. In that situation his life or earning
capacity had no value. To constitute actionable negligence there must be dam-
age, and damage is limited to those elements the statute prescribes.
If it should be found that but for the current he would have fallen with
serious injury, then the loss of life or earning capacity resulting from the
electrocution would be measured by its value in such injured condition. Evi-
dence that he would be crippled would be taken into account in the same
manner as though he had already been crippled.
His probable future but for the current thus bears on liability, as well
as damage.50
Suppose a trespasser, D, drills for oil on P's land, the reputation being
that there is a valuable pool of oil underlying the land, .and finds that in
fact the land is barren of oil. Can P now sue D not only for the
" Ibid., p. 1133.
"'Ibid.,p. 1133.
'
7 Ibid., p. 1134.
4 It must be kept in mind that where there is strict concurrence no separation of
damage can be made.
" 85 N.H. 449, z63 Atl. 111 (1932).
'
0 Ibid., p. 456.
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ordinary damages occasioned by his trespassing, but also for those sums
represented by the diminution in value of the land?5 1
lTas the damage a probably consequence of D's act? I.e., was D's
tort a proximate cause of the damage? Obviously it was. But what
should be the measure of damage-the reputed value less the actual
present value-or the mere loss occasioned by the trespass? 52
' Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Kishi, 276 S.W. 190 (Tex. Comm. App., 1925)5
Marte ct al. v. Hall Oil Co., et al., 36 Wyo. 166 (59z7). See 4 Tex. L. Rev. 2S-
Green.
'2 Judge Peaslee propounds the following example:
A's house on the sands is salable at $5o00 on Jan. sgth. Had B negligently destroyed
it by fire that day, recovery would be $Sooo. On Jan. zoth, the house had been so under-
mined that it was certain the next tide would carry it out to sea. Its value then was nil.
It B negligently burned it bet-ween tides should he be mulcted $5ooo? (a) Suppose the fire
occurred on the sSth, when the effect of the sea was still problematical, and the house
salable at one-half price? (b) Suppose the danger passed without damage to the house and
the house could have been sold for $5ooo?
Suppose the undermining were caused by the wash from B's negligently operated tug.
One more day and actionable damage would have been done. X burns the building negli-
gently. A could have sold the house for only one-half price. Why should X be liable for
more? Answer: The answer is that the purchaser under these circumstances gets a bargain.
He acquires the house, the sound value of which he could recover from X- if the latter
negligently burned it or from B if his continued operations washed it away, or a sound
house if neither event occurred. (47 Harv. L. Rev. xIZ7, 1137.)
The problem of causation appears in the criminal field quite pointedly. Although it is
necessary, generally, to make a fundamental distinction between wrongs inflicting injuries
resulting in death, and those inflicting lesser injuries, where tort law is being considered,
the same problem is not presented in the criminal law. The following situations are illus-
trative:
a) A advises B, a prisoner who is under sentence to be executed, to commit suicide.
B, acting on this advice, commits suicide the night before the day fixed for the execution.
A is guilty of murder. Com. v. Bowen, 13 Mass. 356, 7 Am. Dec. 154 (s8S6). Compare
Com. v. Mink, 1Z3 Mass. 422, z5 Am. Rep. 1o9 (1877).
b) A and B mutually agree to commit suicide. As a result of the attempt, A dies
and B survives. B is guilty of the murder of A. McMahan v. State, s68 Ala. 70, 53 So.
89 (I91O)i Turner v. State, "9 Tenn. 663, 1o8 S.V. 5139, S L.R.A. (N.S.) 988, 523
Am. St. Rep. 758, 14 Ann. Cas. 99o (1907).
c) D's wife is mortally ill and suffering greatly. At her request D places a potion of
"paris green" within her reach. She drinks it and dies. D is guilty of murder. People v.
Roberts, zxs Mich. 187, 178 N.W. 69o, 13 A.L.R. IZ53 (s9zo).
d) A shoots B mortally wounding him. B, having about one hour to live, cuts his
own throat and dies in five minutes. A is guilty of manslaughter. People v. Lewis, 124.
Cal. 551, 57 Pac. 470, 45 L.R.A. 783 (1899).
d-s) Compare with (d): "If one man inflicts a mortal wound, of which the victim is
languishing, and then a second kills the deceased by an independent act, we cannot imagine
how the first can be said to have killed him, without involving the absurdity of saying that
the deceased was killed tvice." State v. States, 50 N.C. 420, 423-424 (1858). Contra:
S3 Vt. 56o.
e) "The thirteenth instruction asked by the counsel for the defendant was properly
refused. The jury would have been informed substantially that a defendant is not guilty
of murder in the killing of a person who has already been mortally wounded by another-
a doctrine which cannot be seriously contended for." People v. Ab Fat, 48 Cal. 6 (s 874).
f) A stabs B in self-defense. B turns to run when A stabs him in the back. B dies.
A is not criminally responsible unless it appears the second wound was mortal. Miller v.
State, 37 Ind. 432 (187).
g) A shoots B. B, at the time, is in the last stages of consumption and has but a
few months to live. The wound, had B been a well man, would probably not have been
fatal. B dies within two months. A is guilty of murder. Hopkins v. Com., 117 Ky. 941,
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Thus far the discussion has been confined to a consideration of causa-
tion with respect to "harmful" consequences, whereas the ultimate
focus of this discussion is concerned with probability of recovery as an
item either exonerating or charging the negligent actor. The fact that
defendant's negligence, standing alone, would be sufficient to charge
him with liability, is not disputed, for purposes of this discourse.
In the preceding material it has been shown that the fact that there
is a not unlikely chance for harm to result from a particular tort, whether
negligent or otherwise, is sufficient to enable the injured party to hold
the actor responsible for the resultant damage on the theory that his
wrong is the proximate cause of the injury. Moreover, in certain
instances liability has been imposed for negligent acts even where the loss
was certain to occur notwithstanding-but where the factor complained
of is a negligent omission, liability does not follow where the damage
was sure to happen. But, there is no requirement that the consequences
be more probable than not. But may a problematical (not unlikely)
chance of recovery be the basis of an action on the theory that the tort has
directly caused the loss of chance and resulted in damage? The principal
case would say "no." However, in Craig v. Chambers, 3 wherein de-
fendant was employed in his professional capacity as physician to treat
plaintiff's injured arm, and failed to effect a cure, the court in dictum
stated: " * * * any want of the proper degree of skill or care which
diminishes the chances of the" patient's recovery, prolongs his illness,
increases his suffering, or, in short, makes his condition worse than it
would have been if due skill and care had been used, would, in a legal
sense, constitute injury." 4 In accord with this conclusion is Rogers v.
Kee5" which quotes the above excerpt from the Chambers case verbatim,
with approval, and adds: "If the result to the plaintiff today is exactly
what it would have been if the defendant had discovered seasonably and
properly treated the fracture, * * * he has sustained no damage on
account of the condition of the hip. But, if you find the condition of the
hip is not all that could reasonably be expected to follow by reasonable
discovery and treatment of the fracture, * * * then you may allow
him such sum as you deem just and reasonable in compensation for such
pain and suffering, bodily and mental, resulting from the defendant's
8o S.W. x56, 4 Ann. Cas. 957 (i9o4). The court said: "If one unlawfully wounds an-
other, and thereby hastens or accelerates his death by reason of some disease with which
he is afflicted, the wrongdoer is guilty of the crime thereby resulting." See z Bishop, Crim.
Law, sec. 368, subsec. 3.
63 17 Ohio St. 254 (1867).
"Ibid., p. 261.
' 171 Mich. 55t, x37 N.W. 260 (i952).
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negligence."" So too, in Burke v. Foster"7 the Kentucky court re-
marked: "We think, when a physician undertakes to give his attention,
care, and skill to a given case of injury or disease, the patient is entitled
to the chance for the better results that are supposed to come from such
treatment, and as are recorded by the science of his profession to a
proper treatment. That the patient might have died in spite of the
treatment, or that "ordinarily" they did die in such cases * * * is no
excuse to the physician who neglects to give his patient the benefit of the
chance involved in a proper treatment of his case." 5 8
But probably the majority of the cases decided on this precise issue
preponderate in favor of the position taken by the principal case." Two
of the leading cases so holding are Green v. Stone" and Connellan v.
Coffey,' in each of which the defendant, being sued for malpractice,
had a verdict. In the former case the court said: "The duty rested upon
the plaintiff to produce testimony before the jury to the effect that the
earlier treatment of the case with reasonable probability would have aided
the patient. As the testimony goes no further than to state that earlier
treatment might have been beneficial, the jury were left purely to specu-
lation as to whether the conduct of the defendant was a cause of the
plaintiff's subsequent condition; and, under the circumstances, the court
did not err in setting aside the verdict."0 2 In the Coffey case plaintiff
broke his arm and defendant was called to attend, but gas gangrene
developed to such an extent as to necessitate amputation. Complainant
contended that the nature of proof of causation in malpractice cases is
"peculiar and exceptional," and that plaintiff should recover if defend-
ant s negligence "deprived the plaintiff of the chances of a better recov-
ery presumed to flow from proper treatment." Citing the Restatement
of Torts, Section 431 (a), (b)," 3 the court held against this contention,
and discussed "those negligent acts or omissions which play so minor
a part in producing the injuries that the law does not recognize them as
Ibid., p. 563.
1 14 Ky. zo, 69 S.W. xo96, 59 L.R.A. 2707 (x9oz). Here plaintiff was suffering
from a multiple-compound fracture of the humerus. Defendant physician examined him
and failed to discover the dislocation of the shoulder. As a result plaintiff was perma-
nently incapacitated. Evidence was that had defendant done all lie should have done,
plaintiff probably would have been more or less incapacitated.
r Ibid., p. z6.
ro In general, on the question of "Proximate Cause in an Action Against a Physician
or Surgeon for Malpractice," see 59 A.L.R. 88S.
'1 5x9 Conn. 3oo, 176 At. 123 (1934).
I zz Conn. 136, 187 At. goi (1936).
C 1j9 Conn. 300, 306.
o See supra, p. 381
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legal cases." 4 And, in Smith v. Dumond"1 the New York court held
that "in order to entitle plaintiff to recover for the permaneht injury
which it was proven that he had sustained, it was necessary to prove that
this permanent injury would not have been present had not the defend-
ant been guilty of negligence or want of skill."" So too, in Wallace v.
Yudelson, 0 where defendant failed to remove a bony growth until the
third operation, on the issue of defendant's negligence, the court excluded
evidence of an expert witness that had the bony growth been removed
at first plaintiff would have been all right, as highly speculative and
incompetent. But see Chase v. Nelson,"5 wherein the court stated that
'tHe had a right in his defense to show that even if his act was a negli-
gent one, that still the nature of Nelson's afflictions were of such a
character that he would have died soon at all events; and although
such a showing might not constitute a complete bar to the action, it was
still important in mitigation of damages." 9 In Lippold v. Kidd7" the
Oregon tribunal concluded that a physician is not liable for the loss of a
patient's eye because of his negligence in failing to remove a foreign
particle from it, if the injury was such that the eye would have been lost
had the particle been removed. There can be no quarrel with this par-
ticular statement, but a reading of the case will disclose that the court
apparently disregarded utterly rather extensive testimony by the defend-
ant himself that only the probabilities were against recovery by plaintiff,
and that the eye might not have been lost."'
But what is the justification for absolution of the tortfeasor in these
instances where the chances for recovery are initially less than half? It
is said that the law of torts does not aim to punish the wrongdoer, but
merely to compensate the injured party; but this cannot support de-
cisions which, in effect, penalize the complainant because of the coinci-
dental concurrence of an innocent substantial cause with the defendant's
OI I22 Conn. 1536, 142.
"If the chain of causation of the damage, when traced from the beginning to the end,
includes an act or omission which, even though wrongful or negligent, is or becomes of no
consequence in the results, or so trivial as to be a mere incident of the operating cause, it
is not such a factor as will impose liability for those results." (P. 142.)
3 Silv. Supp. Ct. 358, 25 N.Y.S.R. 382, 6 N.Y. Supp. 242 (1889).
6 ITbid., p. 244 in N. Y. Supp.
67 244 111. App. 320 (1927).
as 39 111. App. 53 (189o).
'a Ibid., p. 59.
70 126 Ore. 16o, 269 Pac. 21o, 59 A.L.R. 875 (1928).
71 Here defendant, in negligent disregard of accepted medical practice in his locality,
failed to use an ophthalmoscope, or take an X-ray picture, to ascertain the presence of a
small steel sliver in plaintiff's eye. Plaintiff subsequently lost his eye. Testimony was con-
flicting, with experts for the defendant testifying that plaintiff would have certainly lost
his eye at all events. However, defendant himself testified that there was a possibility that
the eye might have been saved.
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negligent tort, and simultaneously permit the actor to go scot free. The
other argument against permitting a plaintiff to profit by a full recovery
from the wrongdoer is valid, but ought not be conclusive. Nor should
the formal contention that, the burden of proof being on the complainant,
he fails to make out his case in these situations, prevail over the obvious
equities of the case. Drawing, at last, our analogy to the previously
considered cases of harmful consequences occasioned by multiple causa-
tion, it would seem not altogether infeasible to apply the suggested pro-
cedure of separating damage, and on this basis to assess the negligent
defendant, who by his tort has deprived plaintiff of an opportunity, albeit
it may be a meager one, to recover from an injury not originally inflicted
by the defendant, such sums as represent his proportionate contribution
to plaintiff's injury. That is, assuming the measure of defendant's lia-
bility to be represented by the unknown X, then, as the prospects of
recovery are to one-hundred, so will X be to the total of the damages
suffered by plaintiff. On this basis of computation defendant would not
be punished, for he would be paying no more than his tort cost plaintiff;
and plaintiff would not be unduly enriched, since his compensation would
be solely gauged with respect to the reasonable worth of his expectancy
of recovery under normal circumstances.
ROBERT H. JONES
PARTNERSHIP
DISSOLUTION AND ASSUMPTION OF DEBTS - EFFECT UPON
RIGHTS OF CREDITORS
A dissolution agreement was drawn up by Benjamin and David
Leiken, partners, operating as the Mansfield Beautician's Supply Co.,
wherein David Leikin agreed, for a consideration, to take over the assets
and assume the obligations of said partnership. The continuing partner
operated under the firm name for a five-month period, at the end of
which time he was adjudged a bankrupt in a proceeding brought by his
creditors. The State of Ohio filed a claim with the referee for sales tax
claimed to be due the state, under the authority of Ohio G.C. 5546-9a.
Part of said tax accrued prior to the dissolution of the partnership and the
remainder subsequent thereto. The trustee contended that if any assess-
ment at all could be made only that part which accrued subsequent to the
dissolution was a provable claim against the bankrupt, and that in any
case the state was not entitled to priority over general creditors, because
the sum due the state was not a tax but a debt. The District Court for
